













Adema Yergaliyeva

Graduate of the 18th cohort of the CDC FETP program. Master of Medical Science in Applied Epidemiology, S.D. Asfendiyarov KazNMU.

Presneted a poster report at the International ID Week Conference in Boston, Massachusets. Principal author of a publication in IDSA Oxford Academic.

Epidemiologist in the branch of the Scientific and Practical Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Expertise, National Center for Public Health of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Kazakhstan.











Outbreak caused by pathogenic bacteria in the intensive care unit of a large hospital in Almaty city



Adema Yergaliyeva (FETP CDC/BS/MD) Manar Smagul (FETP CDC/BS/MD) Dilyara Nabirova (CDC/MD/MPH) Roberta Z Horth (CDC/MPD/PhD/)



65 patients were treated in the ICU of a hospital in Almaty in March – May



PURPOSE OF STUDY




We set the goal of investigating the outbreak



DATA WERE COLLECTED FROM HEALTH RECORDS AND LABORATORY FINDINGS




65 RECEIVED HOSPITAL TREATMENT IN ICU




PATIENTS TRANSFERRED FROM OTHER UNITS INTO ICU:


35%



Demographic profile of patients




Duration of patient treatment in hospital settings




1-5 davs 6-10 davs 11-15 davs 16-20 davs 21-25 davs 26-33 davs


Final diagnoses of patients in the ICU



Morbidity and invasive procedures among ICU patients



Outcome of patients who received hospital treatment in ICU




N = 26 N = 39

63% Acinetobacter baumannii detected in ICU

 Sputum
 n=18/41

 Urine
 n=17/41

 Blood
 n=6/41




N = 41/65

22% *Klebsiella pneumoniae* detected in ICU

 Sputum
 n=9/15

 Urine
 n=3/15


 Blood
 n=3/15



N = 15/65


11% *Staphylococcus aureus* detected in ICU

Sputumn=4/7Urinen=2/7Woundn=1/7



N = 7/65

60% of tested pathogens were resistant to the antibiotic prescribed



	A. baumannii			
	Resistant	Sensitive		
Ceftriaxone (n=34)	22 (65%)	12 (35%)		
Ceftriaxone IV (n=3)	2 (67%)	1 (33%)		
Meropenem (n=1)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)		
Levofloxacin (n=1)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)		
Amikacin (n=1)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)		
Amoxicillin (n=1)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)		

	Klebsiella pneumoniae		
	Resistant	Sensitive	
Ceftriaxone (n=12)	7 (58%)	5 (42%)	
Ceftriaxone IV (n=1)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)	
Levofloxacin (n=1)	1 (100%)	0 (%)	
Amoxicillin (n=1)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)	

Staphylococcus aureus

	Resistant	Sensitive
Ceftriaxone (n=3)	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
Ceftriaxone IV (n=1)	0 (%)	1 (100%)
Meropenem (n=3)	2 (67%)	1 (33%)

Environmental swabs (Pseudomonas aeruginosa, S. Haemolyticus, S. Hominis

	Pseudomonas aeruginosa	S. Haemolyticus	S. Hominis
ICU	ALV No.1 endotracheal tube Patient's bed	Patient's bed	
Stroke unit			Air in the ward
Infectious surge	Sink		

				-		1		
4th floor	Infectious surgery departm	ment			Gynecology department		Pathogens isolated in patients	Total
							Acinetobacter (A.) baumannii	41
	A. baumannii	5			A. baumannii 3		Klebsiella (K.) pneumoniae	15
	K. pneumoniae	2					Staphylococcus (S.) aureus	7
	S. aureus	2					Staphylococcus (S.) haemolyticus	1
]		
3rd floor	ICU №2				ICU №1	ICU (known infections)	7	
	A. baumannii K. pneumoniae	6 3			A. baumannii 3 K. pneumoniae 1 S. aureus 2	A. baumannii 5 K. pneumoniae 2 S. aureus 2		
2nd floor	Therapy department		Stroke unit		Procedure room	Urology department		
	A. baumannii	6	A. baumannii	6		A. baumannii 7		
	K. pneumoniae	3	K. pneumoniae	3		K. pneumoniae 1		
	S. haemolyticus	1						
	ICII- Intensive core unit							k

ICU= Intensive-care unit

Outbreak source and causes:

- Inadequate compliance with infection prevention measures, such as aseptic and antiseptic rules for medical procedures.
- Transfer of pathogens from other units or patients.
- The use of invasive procedures, such as catheter insertion and ALV, increases the risk of infection.
- Antibiotic resistance of pathogens can make treatment more difficult and timeconsuming, increasing the risk of complications, including pneumonia.
- Inadequate disinfection and decontamination regimes for medical devices

During the investigation, we did not receive a clear clinical picture, which complicates identification of the specific source of the outbreak. However, we can assume that the spread of the infection could have been influenced by the identified pathogens.

Recommendations

- Strengthening basic infection control practices such as hand hygiene and PPE use; surveillance; environment cleaning, and communication between providers (hospital units and patients)
- Understanding patient movement patterns and enhancing surveillance and reporting of hospital-acquired infections across hospitals, which will improve regional efforts to contain pathogen outbreaks and prevent outbreaks
- Control of antibiotic prescription before administration to patients, taking into account the determination of microorganism sensitivity











Thank you for your attention!

